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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
UTAH FUNERAL DIRECTORS &
EMBALMERS ASSOCIATION, a Utah
corporation, on behalf of its members, and
on behalf of others similarly situated,
Appellant,
vs.
MEMORIAL GARDENS OF THE
VALLEY, INC., a Utah corporation;
LAKE HILLS, a Utah corporation;
MEMORIAL TRUST, INC., a Utah
corporation; AULTOREST MEMORIAL
CORPORATION, a Utah corporation;
HAL S. BENNETT, DONALD HACKING
and RAYMOND W. GEE, members of the
Business Regulation Commission of the
State of Utah; and VIRGIL L. NORTON,
Commissioner of Insurance of the State
of Utah,
Respondents.

Case No.

10236

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT, MEMORIAL GARDENS
OF THE VALLEY, INC.
APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT OF THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH. HONORABLE STEWART M. HANSON, JUDGE.

STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
Memorial Gardens of the Valley, Inc. agrees
somewhat with the statement of the kind of case
set forth in Appellant's Brief, however, there are
matters upon which we feel we should comment. We
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wish to point out that this Defendant-Respondent
is not issuing or selling pre-need contracts through
associates as stated in Appellant's Brief (A. B. 2).
We do not believe that it necessarily follows
that what the various Defendant-Respondents are
doing will require the various morticians and funeral directors to follow a similar plan. Much of the
business of funeral directors and morticians is noncompetitive by its very nature (AB-2).
As a further comment in respect to this argument of Appellant, this Respondent cannot see that
there is anything wrong with making it possible for
people who have lost loved ones to arrange for funeral services at a savings when, perhaps, the breadwinner of the family has been taken away.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The case was argued before the lower Court by
the Plaintiffs as stated on pages 3 and 4 of its Brief.
This Defendant in its presentation to the Court
stated the following issues:
A. That the Complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against Memorial Gardens of the Valley, Inc. on the grounds that
there is no juisticiable issue between Plaintiffs and
the Defendants.
B. That the provisions of Section 22-4-1,
U.C.A., 1953 (1-7) are unconstitutional and violate
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3
the due process clauses of the Constitution of the
State of Utah and the Federal Constitution.
C. That this Defendant is neither a licensed
embalmer or funeral director.
D. That the "Family Security Agreement" of
this Defendant is not an insurance contract.
The final decree of the lower Court ( R-44, 48)
sets forth the decision of the Court which decided
in favor of the Defendant on constitutional grounds,
but further decided that there did exist a justiciable
issue between the Plaintiffs and the Defendants.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
This Defendant seeks a decision of this Court
affirming the decision of the lower Court that the
act is unconstitutional as found by the lower Court.
This Respondent also seeks a ruling of this Court
that there does not exist a justiciable issue between
the Appellants and the Respondents.
ARGUMENT
Point 1.
MEMORIAL GARDENS OF THE VALLEY,
INC. IS NEITHER A FUNERAL DIRECTOR
NOR AN EMBALMER ,AND ITS "FAMILY SECURITY AGREEMENT" DOES NOT VIOLATE
THE PROVISIONS OF SECTIONS 58-9-10 AND
58-9-22, U. C. A. 1953.
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At page 3 of Appellant's Brief it is stated that
Appellant asked for a declaration "that a licensed
embalmer or funeral director performing services
pursuant to a pre-need contract obtained by solicitation is guilty of unprofessional and unethical conduct."
This statement is not accurate as to the Respondent's position and particularly in respect to
the operations of Memorial Gardens of the Valley,
Inc., inasmuch as this company is not engaged either
as an embalmer or as a funeral director. Memorial
Gardens of the Valley, Inc., operates a cemetery.
Our "Family Service Agreement" does not provide for embalming or for the directing of a funeral.
The agreement provides only for the services rendered by a cemetery, and the selling of a casket.
Sub-paragraph A-8 of the Agreement provides:
COMPLETE INTERMENT SERVICE: To
provide, if enumerated as purchased, the opening and closing of ________ graves upon the order
of the Purchaser, his heirs or assigns only in
the Company's Gardens. Said opening and
closing of graves shall also include the use of
the Memory Chapel or the chapel tent, lowering device, greens, chairs, and other equipment as is usually provided by the Company
for this purpose. To record the name of the
departed in the Perpetual Remembrance Book
located in the Memory Chapel.
·This provision of the Agreement does not provide for embalming, for funeral clothes, for funeral
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cars or for other facilities, which might be necessary
for the burial of the dead. Nor does it provide for
a funeral director or for other persons to assist with
the funeral. We have carefully read our Agreement
and fail to find language which provides for these
services as is claimed by Appellant. (AB-23)
If a licensed mortician or embalmer should engage in the solicitation of future funeral services,
he might then come within the provisions of Sections
59-9-10 and 22, U.C.A., 1953, which sets forth unprofessional and unethical conduct. Memorial Gardens of the Valley, Inc., however, is not within this
classification as it is neither an embalmer nor a
funeral director, and is engaged in the conduct and
operation of a cemetery and the incidental supplies
and facilities which are necessary for the interment
of a ·body. Furthermore, if Appellants desire a decision on this matter they should bring an action
against one of their own members who might be
soliciting funeral services, and not against this Defendant which does not !
The Appellant in its Brief (AB-11) states that
the contract of Defendant, Memorial Gardens of the
Valley agrees to do every act done by a licensed funeral director and embalmer. Attention is called to
the definition of the practice of embalming as found
in Section 58-9-9, U.C.A., 1953, which is as follows:
Either the embalming of dead human
bodies, or the preparation for transportation
of human bodies, dead of a contagious or infectious disease, constitutes the practice of
embalming.
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The "Family Security Agreement" of the Memorial Gardens of the Valley, Inc., in no place provides
for such services as set forth and defined by the
above statute. It does not mention embalming either
directly or by inference. We cannot agree with the
statement of Plaintiff's counsel that this Defendant
agrees to do every act done by a licensed embalmer.
Attention is also called to the provisions of Section 58-9-14, U.C.A., 1953, which defines a funeral
director as follows :
"Funeral directors" mean and includes a
person engaged ·in :
(a) Preparing for burial or disposal and
directing and s-upervising the burial or disposing of dead human bodies, as a profession;
(b) Maintaining or employed in a funeral establishment devoted to the care and preparation for burial, transportation or other
disposition of dead human bodies; and
(c) Who shall, in connection with his
name or funeral establishment, use the words
"funeral director" or "undertaker" or "mortician" or any other title implying that he is
engaged as a "funeral director" as herein defined.
Nowhere within the "Family Security Agreement" of Memorial Gardens of the Valley does there
appear any language which might be interpreted
to include the definitions as set forth in the above
quoted statute.
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The operations of Memorial Gardens of the
Valley, Inc. with its "Family Security Agreement"
is not that of solicitation of dead human bodies as
described in Appellants' Brief, page 10, but it is
that of the selling of interment spaces and a casket
at a time when the parties to the agreement are not
beset with grief during which time they might not
be in a condition to give due consideration to the
financial burdens or problems which might then
exist. The sale by this Respondent is at a time when
the parties to the agreement are able to fully and
adequately consider the financial and other problems
which are necessarily involved with the burial of
a loved one.
Appellant further argues (AB-12) that Defendants are violating the unprofessional conduct
statute because the Defendants are "acting as
agents, employees and representatives of the particular licensed funeral director and embalmer involved."
Appellant is reading into the contracts of the
Defendants, and in particular into the "Family Security Agreement," of Memorial Gardens of the Valley, Inc., some language which simply is not in the
agreement. Nowhere can there be found language
within the agreement which states that Memorial
Gardens of the Valley, Inc., is acting as an agent,
employee, or representative of a particular licensed
funeral director, or of any licensed funeral directors, or embalmers. There is not any evidence that
this Respondent is acting as an agent by express or
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implied agreement for any licensed embalmer or funeral director. We, therefore, submit that the argument of the Appellants in respect to any possible
unethical conduct on the part of a licensed embalmer
or funeral director is without merit in view of the
contract or agreement of this Respondent and the
pleadings which are before the Court. This matter
came on before the Court on the Appellants' Motion
For Summary Judgment. The evidence before the
Court consisted of the pleadings and the contracts
which are made part of the pleadings and this was
the entire evidence before the Court at the time it
rendered its decision.
It is contended that there is agency by ratification (AB-14). There is no agency by ratification
in connection with the Memorial Gardens of the Valley "Family Security Agreement" inasmuch as there
is nothing sold to the purchaser other than that which
is specified in the agreement sold by Memorial Gardens of the Valley, Inc. There is nothing within the
"Family Security Agreement" which controls the
operations of a funeral director or embalmer, and
there is nothing within the agreement which a funeral director or embalmer must or can ratify.
Appellants attempt to make the act of Memorial Gardens of the Valley, Inc. in selling a "Family Security Agreement," the act by ratification of
some funeral director or embalmer. This argument
is without substance as there is nothing within the
agreement which points to a funeral director or embalmer. The argument as set forth by the Plaintiff
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is without substance and is not factually true when
considered with the agreement which is part of the
record, and which is the only record before the Court
as far as this Respondent is concerned.
Point II.
MEMORIAL GARDENS OF THE VALLEY'S
AGREEMENT PROVIDES FOR A TRUST SUFFICIENT TO PROTECT THE PUBLIC.
We agree with the Plaintiff that. it is important
and worthwhile to guaranty the performance of the
contracts or agreements entered into by this Repondent, and the other Respondents similarly concerned.
We point with pride to the provisions of the "Family
Security Agreement" of this Respondent (R-8) Subsection 8 which reads as follows :
B. Guarantee of Performance: That in
order to assure the performance of the delivery of merchandise and services covered by
this agreement, the Company agrees that it
will set aside in an irrevocable trust fund,
sufficient money, based upon its present
wholesale costs with reliable manufacturers,
to pay for said merchandise and services when
delivered. Any income or excess amounts over
and above the actual costs of the merchandise
and services will be paid to the Perpetual Care
Trust Fund of Memorial Gardens of the Valley, Inc.
The provisions of the agreement of Memorial
Gardens of the Valley, Inc., are in substantial agree-
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ment with the provisions of Section 22-4-1, U.C.A.
'
1953. Such statutory regulation, however, must be
reasonable. It is not necessary for the protection of
the public to deposit the entire contract price in trust
as the public is amply protected if the reasonable
cost of the item which is purchased is deposited in
trust, and the seller is allowed his normal selling
commission or profit for services rendered in securing the agreement. It should be noted that paragraph
"B" set out above provides that this Respondent
agrees to set up in an irrevocable trust the money
necessary and sufficient to fulfill its obligations under the agreement. We do, however, wish to point
out that to require this Respondent or any other
party in a similar position to deposit the full amount
of the purchase price or agreement in trust is a
punitive measure and will in effect prevent the Defendant from engaging in a lawful business which
is for the benefit of the Defendant and also for the
benefit of the public as a whole.
.

Point III
THE COMPLAINT DOES NOT STATE
F A C T S SUFFICIENT TO CONSTITUTE A
CAUSE OF ACTION.
It is alleged by the Appellants that the business
activities of the Respondents are, under the statutes,
illegal, and that the agreements used by the Respondents as alleged in securing business are in part
insurance contracts and securities. Appellants allege
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that the use of the said agreements require that the
Respondents be licensed by the Securities Commission and by the Insurance Department of the State
of Utah.
The allegations of the Complaint do not make
a justiciable issue between the Appellants and the
Respondents of such a nature as to permit consideration by this Court. The statutes relied upon by Appellants are regulatory statutes. If the Respondents
are not conforming with the law, it is the State of
Utah or its agencies which should proceed against
those who might be considered to be violating the law.
A declaratory action must be based on an actual controversy. The interest of the parties must
be more than merely general. There must be a substantial present interest in the relief sought by the
Complaint. See 174 ALR 550.
The Appellants are not entitled to a declaratory
judgment which, in effect would be to advise the
officials of the Business Regulation Commission and
the Commissioner of Insurance as to their duties
and responsibilities. If this Respondent is considered
to have violated one of the regulatory statutes of
the State of Utah it should be the appropriate state
official who should bring an action for the final determination of such matters and not the Appellants
herein. See Lyon vs. Bateman, 119 U. 435, 228 P.2d
819, at 439 Utah.
The type of justiciable controversy which
must exist before declaratory relief can be
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granted is defined in Section 8, on page 27,
Anderson, Declaratory Judgments, as follows:
''A controversy, in the sense in which the
word is used in the Constitution in defining
judicial power, particularly of the Federal
Courts, must be one that· is appropriate for
judicial determination as distinct from a difference or dispute of hypothetical or abstract
character or from one which is academic or
moot, but must be definite and concrete,
touching the legal relation of the parties in
adverse legal interest, and must be a real and
substantial controversy admitting of specific
relief through a decree conclusive in character as distinct from an opinion or advice of
what the law would be on a hypothetical state
of facts."
The facts argued by Appellants are hypothetical and do not appear by the reading of the pleadings on file herein. Appellants are asking the Court
to give an advisory opinion on a set of facts which
are not in evidence and are hypothetical only. The
United States Supreme Court has said:
The requirements for a justiciable case
for controversy are no less strict in a declaratory judgment proceeding than in any other
type of suit. Alabama State Federation of Labor, Local Union No. 3, United Brotherhood
of Carpenters and Joiners vs. McAdory, 65
Supreme Court 1384, 1389.
The Court also said in the same case that it is
without power to give advisory opinions and that it
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has been its "considered practice not to decide abstract, hypothetical or contingent questions."
Certainly the Plaintiff in this case is asking the
Court to decide something which is contingent upon
this Defendant doing something which is in violation of the law, and as of this time there is no evidence to support such contention.
See the Montana case of Waite vs. Holmes, 327
P.2d. 399, 133 Mt. 512. In that case a licensed
insurance agent brought an action against the state
auditor as ex-officio insurance commissioner for the
State of Montana, and the Canadian Insurance Company, which he claimed was operating in the State
of Montana under a void license. He desired to have
the license. revoked.
The Court stated on page 402, P.2d:
· Stated in the form of an interrogatory,
Plaintiff's proposition may be phrased: Does
.Plaintiff have any right to enjoin competition
·which stems from a competitor operating under a void license or franchise or a right to
have such competitor's license cancelled or revoked?
The Court held that the Plaintiff did not have
any such right. It stated:
Or, stated another way, the Plaintiffs
had no property right which had been injured.
Governed by the above rules, we can state the
proposition thusly: If Plaintiff does not have
a right to be free from the competition of the
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Defendant, then any injury flowing from such
competition is damnum absque injuria.
The Court further stated at page 407 P.2d:
.
The Plaintiffs' right of action, therefore,
falls squarely within the Restatement rule***
which states that where the purpose· of the
statute is merely "police" regulation or supervision, then Plaintiff has no right of action.
See also the case of Backman vs. Salt Lake
County, 13 U.2d. 412-416, 375 P.2d. 756. In com4
menting as to whether there was a justiciable controversy in respect to an action for a declaratory
judgment the Court said:
We cannot see how there could be a true
adversary proceeding under such circumstances. That is not to say that in a proper
proceeding other than the type here, at which
evidence might be adduced and findings made,
the matter would be incontestible, - but simply that the Declaratory Judgments Act is not
designed for giving advisory opinions in a
non-adversary action, or to insure against
feared risks. We reaffirm the language of
Lyon vs. Bateman where we said:
"While the statutes authorizing courts to
render declaratory relief should be liberally
construed in order to provide prompt settlements of controversies and to stabilize uncertain legal relations, courts, nevertheless, must
operate within the constitutional and statutory powers and duties imposed upon them.
They are not supposed to be a forum for hearing academic contentions or rendering ad-
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visory opinions. In order to maintain an action for declaratory relief, plaintiffs must
show that the justiciable and jurisdictional
elements requisite in ordinary actions are
present, and a judgment can be rendered o!llY
in a real controversy between adverse parties.
Generally, courts have held that the condi. .
tions which must exist before a declaratory
judgment action can be maintained are: ( 1)
a justiciable controversy; ( 2) the interests
of the parties must be adverse; ( 3) the party
seeking such relief must have a legally protectible interest in the controversy; and ( 4)
the issues between the parties involved must
be ripe for judicial determination."
Point IV
THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 22-4-1,
U.C.A., 1953 ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND
VIOLATE THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSES OF
THE STATE AND FEDERA.L CONSTITUTIONS.
The provisions of Section 22-4-1 to 7, U.C.A.
1953 ( 1963 Supp.) are not a valid exercise of the
legislative power of the state in view of the provisions of the Constitution of the State of Utah and
the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of
the United States, and therefore are illegal and unconstitutional.
The pre-need act when considered as a whole is
an unreasonable and arbitrary restriction which results in stifling or preventing the operation of an
otherwise lawful business. All of which is done under
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the cloak of a statutory regulation purportedly for
the protection of the public.
It is a violation of federal and state constitutional provisions to enact unreasonable .and oppressive regulatory measures. The general rule of law
is well-stated in 11 Am. Jur. Constitutional Law
paragraph 263:
In the consideration of the relationship
between the equal protection clause and the
.police power of the states, the principle must
be kept in mind that as in the regulation of
all rights secured from infringement by Federal constitutional guaranties, it is settled
that the police power is subordinate to the constitutional guaranty of equality of privilege
and of burden contained in this clause. Therefore, any attempted exercise of police power
which results in a denial of the equal.protection of the law is invalid.
Under the limitations of the equal··protection clause, in order to· justify the interposition of the authority of the state in enacting police regulations,. it must appear that
the interests of the public generally as distinguished from those of a particular class require such interference, for it is a rule that
police power cannot be invoked to protect one
·class of citizens against another class unless
such interference is for the real protection
of society in general.
A Utah case in which the Supreme Court of
Utah considered a regulatory ordinance is Ritholz
vs. City of Salt Lake 3 U 2d 385, 285 P.2d 702 at 706.
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The Court held unconstitutional an .ordinance prohibiting advertising of the prices of eyeglasses on
the grounds that it did not constitute a proper exercise ·of police power. In answer to the argument, as
is here espoused, that such regulation was for the
protection of the public the Court said:
It should be noted that the law cannot
be made, nor · could one be enforced, which
would entirely ·protect the completely naive
and gullible. In any event, if a customer desires to use ordinary care adequate protection
is afforded . . .
The statutory regulations contained in the preneed law wherein one hundred percent of all money
received on pre-need contracts is required to be
placed in trust is confiscatory and deprives the Defendant of its property without due process of law.
The requirement of the statute prevents the Defendant from operating a legitimate business inasmuch
as certain fixed expenses and the cost of acquisition
of business must be paid. It discriminates against a
particular mode of doing business, and inasmuch
as it does not provide equal protection of the laws
it is class legislation.
See the case entitled: State vs. Memorial Gardens Development Corp. (1957) 143 W.Va. 182,
101 SE 2d. ·425, 68 ALR 2d. 1233. This case, which
is the closest case in point involved a statute very
similar to the Utah pre-need law, and which required all funds collected upon pre-need burial contracts to be deposited in trust accounts for the bene-
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fit of policyholders and withdrawn only upon the
death or demand of the insured, with the result that
no money was available for operating expense or
profit. The statute was held to be unconstitutional
as unreasonably singling out and discriminating
against an otherwise lawful business which the Court
pointed out was not any more potentially fraudulent
than any other merchandising business and as impairing freedom of contract by discrimination between kinds and classes of businesses. The Court
in State vs. Memorial Gardens Development Corp.
had the following to say at 68 ALR 2d 1242 relative
to the effect of the one hundred percent trust fund
requirements:
. The statute here involved which requires
impounding of all purchase money has a prohibitory rather than regulatory effect, because no one could without other types of business or finances afford to engage in such
business which allowed no expenditure of the
funds for operational expenses ...
The Court also had the following to say at 68
ALR 2d. 1241-1242 relative to unfair classification
or legislation and the resulting effect such legislation might have upon fair competition:
· Although it may be to some degree popular to enact, and much may be said in favor
of, laws protecting the unsuspecting and incompetent in their purchases gullibly made
of property for future delivery and the possibility of vendors failing for one reason or another to deliver, the provisions of the two
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Constitutions contemplate and provide to all
citizens freedom of contract so that any legislative acts passed may not discriminate between kinds or classes of business which are
considered legal. State v. Goodwill, 33 W. Va.
179, 10 SE 285, 6 LRA 621; Marlow v. Ringer, 79 W. Va. 568, 91 SE 386, LRA 1917D
619; Koppers Coal Co. v. Compensation Commissioner, 123 W. Va. 621, 17 SE 2d. 330.
Were it not for the protection thus afforded
by the Constitution any small legitimate business which could not protect itself by the vote
of a majority of the legislative bodies could
find itself unfairly and unjustly classified as
illegal and its contracts void or its business
so regulated as to destroy or impair it by reason of a simple legislative declaration to the
effect that it involved a matter affecting the
public morals, public health or public welfare.
So the reason for the constitutional provisions,
the supreme law of the land, is very obvious.
It is always unfortunate to some when fair
competition seriously affects one's business,
but that alone affords no legitimate reason
for the requisition of the competitor. Fair and
legal competition is generally more wholesome and beneficial to the public than otherwise, and should not be suppressed by impairing or destructive legislation.
See also the case entitled Memorial Trust, Inc.
vs. Sam N. Beery, decided November 14, 1960, 356
P.2d. 884, Colo. This was an action involving a regution based upon a statute providing that all funds
received from the sale of prepaid funeral benefits
should be invested in trust funds without allowance
for acquisition costs.
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Memorial entered into agreements by which it
agreed to arrange for a mortuary to provide a casket selected. by the purchaser, and services incident
to funerals. The contract provided that Memorial
should retain 25 percent of the purchase price, and
put the remaining 75 percent in trust.
The Commissioner of Insurance brought an action for a declaratory judgment. The Court held
that the regulation adopted by the Commission was
nullity and that the statute in those particulars
~as violative of due process and unconstitutional.
The case in its holding struck down a one-hundred
percent trust provision established by the regulation, which was apparently consistent with the language of the statute.

a

Some reasonable regulation is probably advisable, but it appears to this Defendant that the onehundred percent trust fund regulation is so restrictive that it deprives one from engaging in business
which is needed and desired by the citizens of the
state.
The provisions of Section 22-4-1, U.C.A., 1953
( 1-7) are, in their effect, prohibitory, although on
their face appear to be only regulatory. Under the
Utah statute the contract is unenforceable by the
party attempting to provide funeral services at a
reasonable cost. The other contracting party can
withdraw his money at any time; and as required
by the statute, all the money must be held in trust.
The right to contract is guaranteed to each citizen
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of our country by the law, if the subject of the contract is lawful and the public is not injured.
See an excellent discussion of the constitutional
rights of a citizen to contract in State vs. Gateway
Mortuaries, Inc., 87 Montana 225, 287 P. 156,
( 1930), where a statute rendered void a pre-arranged funeral which was not contracted in con~
templation of immediate death. The conviction of
the Defendants by the lower Court was reversed by
the Supreme Court of the State of Montana.
The Montana court said at page 161 Pacific:
Having found the act unreasonable, arbitrary, and violative of the provisions of the
constitutions of the United States and of this
state, it is our duty to declare it void and we
do without hesitation.
The Respondent, Memorial Gardens of the Valley; Inc., is engaged in enabling those who do business with it to arrange for at least part of the contemplated funeral expense at a time when they give
due consideration to the expenditure contemplated.
This is to be distinguished from the "at-need" pressures surrounding the purchase of funeral arrangements immediately upon the death of a loved one
when perhaps far more elaborate and expensive merchandise is sold than would have been purchased
prior to need. Under such circumstances the purchaser can be subject to unusual pressures and hasty
decisions. It is our contention that pre-need agreements are most beneficial and helpful under proper
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supervision to the public as a whole. The contracting for the sale of caskets, burial space, grave memorials and for services in maintaining a cemetery on
a pre-need basis fills the desires and needs of many
people. It is not dishonorable or immoral.
The requirement that all of the contract price
be placed in trust goes far beyond reasonable regulation under the police power. Its affect is to prohibit a useful and needed business. A life insurance
company or a casualty insurance company is not
required to place in its reserves one-hundred percent
of all premiums collected. It is allowed a reasonable
operating and acquisition allowance. The national
institutions are not required to maintain a hundred
percent reserve. The reasonable and responsible way
to provide for performance would be to require
enough funds to be set aside to buy the merchandise
at manufacturer's prices; this would guaranty performance which should be the only object of any
statute regulating a pre-need business.
An enlightening and persuasive case is that of
Prate Undertaking Company vs. State Board of Embalming, 55 R.I. 454, 182 Atl. 808, 104 A.L.R. 389,
(1936). In this case the Supreme Court of the State
of Rhode Island had for its consideration a statute
which provided for the loss of a certificate to do
bt1siness as an undertaker if one "participates in a
like scheme or plan wherein there is contained any
agreement or provision that deprives heirs or next
of kin from freedom of choice as to the type or style
or price of equipment used in connection with the
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funeral, or the freedom of choice as to what funeral
director shall be employed." The Court had the following to say at 104 ALR 399-400:
A statute, or any part thereof, cannot
be given effect, if under the guise of the police
power in the public interest, but actually to
bring about some object outside of the proper
scope of that power, it arbitrarily or oppressively interferes with a person or property
in relation to recognized guaranteed rights.
No good reason has been called to our attention, and none occurs to us, which makes it
necessary in the interest of the general public
that an individual, if he desires, should not
be free to make a contract concerning the details of his own funeral with an undertaker
who is conducting a burial association scheme
or burial certificate plan, or that such undertaker should not be able in like manner to
enter into a binding contract with a person
concerning the latter's funeral, without placing himself in a class of those not entitled to
a certificate and therefore not able to do business. The clause in question seems to go beyond the general purpose of the act in its
relation to the public welfare. Mter careful
consideration, and realizing fully the seriousness of our duty in passing upon the validity
of an act of the Legislature, we are of the
opinion that the part of Section 13 now under
consideration constitutes an unreasonable and
oppressive restriction upon the liberty of contract secured by Section 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitu~ion, and that this part of the act in question
Is clearly and palpably in excess of legislative
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power, and therefore, that it is in violation
of the provisions of said Fourteenth Amendment and unconstitutional.
We submit that the Utah pre-need statute has
as its real purpose under the cloak of purported
public interest, the stifling of the business activities
of the Respondents herein. Although some reasonable regulation might be desirable the present statutes are not in the public's good.

Point V
THE AGREEMENT IS NOT AN INSURANCE CONTRACT.
It is urged by Appellants that the "Agreement"
of" this Respondent is an insurance contract and
therefore should come under the supervision of the
insurance department. This contention is not supported by our definition of insurance.
Section 35-1-7, U.C.A., 1953, is as follows:
Insurance is a contract whereby one undertakes to indemnify another or pay or allow
a specified or ascertainable amount or benefit upon determinable risk contingencies.
See the case of South Georgia Funeral Homes, Inc.
vs. Harrison, Georgia 1936, 188 SE 529, in which
case the Court discussed the principle of risk as it
related to pre-need funeral contracts as follows:
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The contract now being sold by the defendant and by reason of the sale of which
this contempt proceeding arose, is one wherein the defendant corporation, for a fixed and
definite sum in hand paid or payable in installments, agrees to render and perform or
cause to be rendered and performed for the
purchaser or any one of his family, certain
funeral services. . . . While the performance
of the contract is contingent upon death, this
in and of itself does not make it a contract
of life insurance, nor does the fact that the
fixed sum is payable in installments. There
is nothing in the contract itself nor is there
any evidence to show that the amount paid by
a purchaser is less than the value of the funeral services contracted to be performed, or that
there is any element of risk involved, either
on the part of the purchaser or the defendant
corporation. The contract on its face does not
appear to be one of life insurance.
Examination of the "Family Security Agreement" of this Respondent will show that it cannot
be classified as an insurance contract.
The Agreement requires that the one purchasing the casket or burial space must pay a fixed and
definite price. The price is the same regardless of
the age of the contracting party or the condition of
his health. There is no forgiveness feature by which
Memorial Gardens of the Valley, Inc. would assume
or forgive the balance which might be due upon the
contract upon the death of the purchaser.
The Agreement does not contemplate that delivery should be made after death, but the agreement
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sets out that upon receipt of the full sum and upon
the request of the purchaser, his heirs or assigns,
it agrees to convey the contemplated property or
merchandise.
Even under the provisions of the pre-need law,
with which we do not agree, the agreement may be
revoked at any time by the purchaser and, in that
event, all amounts paid by him under the contract
must be refunded.
Another feature which distinguishes the agreement from an insurance contract is that the purchaser shall have the right "at any time to sell or
transfer his interest herein, as evidenced by an interment deed or bill of sale which is to be issued."
Such a provision is certainly not the provision of an
insurance contract.
The agreement also provides that there shall
be placed in a trust, sufficient money based upon
wholesale costs to pay for the merchandise and services when delivered.
There was no intent on the part of the legislature to place the control of the cemetery or mortuary business or the sale of caskets or other burial
supplies under the control of the insurance commissioner when the statutes referred to were enacted.
There is no ·reference in the insurance code to such
contracts or agreements although the insurance code
was devised and adopted by the 1963 session of the
legislature.
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The pre-need statute in effect negates the
thought that such agreements are insurance contracts. Section 22-4-6, U.C.A. 1953, 1963 Supplement, which is a part of the pre-need law, is as
follows:
This act shall not apply to or affect the
operations and business of duly licensed associations or companies under the insurance
laws of the State of Utah.
The legislature recognized that there were organizations which were under the insurance laws
but it would appear that it felt that the pre-need
arrangements were different and that they should
come under the provisions of the special pre-need
statute. The statute was tailored for those situations
in which individuals might wish to arrange for and
pay for at least part of the cost of a funeral prior
to the actual need.
See the case entitled Barveler vs. Oregon Physician's Service, 194 Ore. 659, 243 P.2d 1050 (1952)
in which case the Court found the hospital association not subject to the provisions of the general insurance code inasmuch as hospital associations were
covered under a separate statute. Such is the case
here.

CONCLUSION
There exists no justiciable issue between the
Plaintiff and Memorial Gardens of the Valley, Inc.
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The "Family Security Agreement" is not an insurance policy and does not come under the jurisdiction
of the Instlrance Department of the State of Utah.
The pr.e-nee.d law passed by the legislature is unconstitutional and void. It is an attempt to stifle and
prevent a legitimate and much needed service to the
public.
The Court should affirm the decision of the
lower Court and declare Section 22-4-1 to 7, U.C.A.,
( 1963 Sup.) unconstitutional and void.
Respectfully submitted
CHARLES WELCH, JR.
J. LAMBERT GIBSON
Lamoreaux & Gibson

Attorneys for Memorial
Gardens of the Valley, Inc.
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